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政治・陰謀

不平等な日米関係 独立の日はいつ来るのか?



不平等な日米関係 
独立の日はいつ来るのか?

http://www.asyura2.com/15/senkyo190/msg/778.html
投稿者 pochi 日時 2015 年 8 月 17 日 09:26:51: gS5.4Dk4S0rxA

Sputnik 日本
2015年08月17日 00:18

不平等な日米関係 独立の日はいつ来るのか?
http://jp.sputniknews.com/japan/20150817/755253.html


オランダの社会政治評論家カレル・ヴァン・ウォルフレン氏は、
自身の論文の中で「日本が戦後手にした最も重要な負の遺産は、
真の独立国家としての地位を取り戻せなかったことだ」と指摘した。


以下、氏の論文の内容を抜粋して御紹介したい。

「終戦からしばらくの時期、吉田茂及び岸信介両首相は
『日本が米国に暗黙のうちに従属するのは、一時的なものだと覚悟し、
国力を蓄えたら、そうした関係を捨て去ることができるだろう』と考えていた。


しかし彼らの後に続いて、首相の座に就いた人達は、
そうした事を思い起こすのをもう止めてしまった。


日本の新しい世代の政治家達は、自主的な対外政策とは
一体何かについて想像する能力さえ失ってしまったのだ。


しかしその中で、突破口を開く事を運命づけられた政治家も確かにいた。
例えば鳩山(由紀夫)政権は、中国との善隣関係確立を目指すと表明したが、
すぐに米国政府に罰せられてしまった。


鳩山氏が、日米共同で地域問題解決に向けた
新しいアプローチを作成できるよう、


選ばれたばかりのオバマ大統領に会おうとした時の、
ホワイトハウスと米国務省は、
日本の首相と会う時間を割かなかった。

民主党のリーダーだった鳩山氏は、少なくとも三度、会談を要請したが、
毎回、それはひどく外交慣例に反するやり方で拒絶されている。


米国は、そうしたやり方で、
鳩山民主党政権の改革路線に
自分達が反対である事を示したのだろう。

とはいえ『米国に忠実な政治家達』も、
必ずしも好意を持って受け入れられるわけではない。


自由民主党の安倍晋三氏が政権の座についた時、
彼はまずロシアと中国を訪れる可能性があった。

彼には、クリルや尖閣諸島の領土問題を、首脳同士の
非公開会談で調整できるかもしれない良いチャンスがあったからだ。

しかし安倍氏は、伝統に従いホワイトハウスで
米国大統領に会見してもらう事を、まず最初に選んだ。

彼はそれを強く望んだ。なぜなら、
もし問題が中国との現実的な攻撃の応酬にまで発展した場合、


彼は、米国が自分達の安全を守ってくれるはずだとの
確信を得たかったからである。


けれどワシントンは、自分のやり方で行動し、
オバマ大統領のスケジュールに空きがないと説明して、
安倍氏に順番待ちの列に並ぶよう命じ、数カ月待たせたのだった。


米港政府は、一方で日本を、太平洋西岸地域で
米国が覇権を目指す戦いにおける道具とみなしながら、


他方では、日本国内の雰囲気が、
1930年代の軍国主義時代に戻らないよう注意深く監視する
特別警察官の役割を演じたいと望んでいる。


安倍首相について言えば、彼がしがみついている政策は、
互いに調和し難い二つの路線に分かれている。


おそらく彼は、何よりも、右翼の幻想の中だけに
存在するような日本を再生したいと願っている。

そこでの生活は調和的に営まれ、
若者は礼儀正しく、皆が祖国への愛を示さねばならない。

同時に彼は、国の自衛力に関する法律を強化し、憲法を見直し、
マスコミに対する監視を厳しくする事で、ワシントンを喜ばせたいと欲している。」


ウォルフレン氏は、日本は世界にとどろいた奇跡の経済成長も
米国なしでは達成できなかったはずだと認めている。

ウォルフレン氏は、だがもはや、忠誠的な立場をとりつづけても、
それは何の功も奏さないと指摘する。

米国の擁護は理論上だけのことであり、
グローバル経済も政治情勢も
ラディカルな変化を遂げてしまったからだ。


「私が日本の有名な政治家、数人と話したところ、彼らは米国が一連のメタモルフォーゼを経過してしまったこと、米国の行う、『全面的な覇権』に照準を当てた、あまり筋の通っていない政策は、将来性のある戦略にはそぐわないことを理解していた。米国が世界中でグローバルな政治的安全保障を確保できるなどと考 えるのは、まったく可笑しい。」


ウォルフレン氏は、
日本が、現在世界が直面している大きな変化に対応する能力に欠けるがゆえに
損失を蒙るのではないかとの見方を示している。


それは北朝鮮の敵意は「冷戦」の続きではなく、別の政治的現実であり、
全く新たな外交アプローチを必要とするものだからというのがウォルフレン氏の見解だ。


「沖縄の米軍駐留は日本の防衛のためではない。
彼らは攻撃力として機能しているのであり、
中東、中央アジアに派遣しうる軍事力だ。

厳しい言い方をすれば、 沖縄駐留米軍は、
米軍の基地使用は日本防衛のためだけであるという
日米の平和条約に違反して、あの場所に駐屯しているのだ。


もし北朝鮮との問題が発生すれば、
これと最初に突き当たるのは韓国と中国だ。

仮に日本が北朝鮮の仮想的な脅威を
真剣に受け止めているのであれば、
北朝鮮との外交深化に取り組まねばならない。」


ウォルフレン氏は、シベリアを通り、
中国の沿岸都市と欧州の港を直で結ぶ高速鉄道の建設など、

ユーラシアのインフラに広範な変化が起きることによって、
近い将来、日本はチャンスを逸する恐れがあると指摘する。
(こうした鉄道は史上かつてない貨物量を誇る交易ルートになることは間違いない。)


「長期的には日本は、
もし米国の全面的覇権の達成計画に引きずられるがままであれば、
自分の身にさらに不快な事態を招くリスクを犯すだろう。」







p14-wolferen-c-20150816-870x682.jpg

Japanese representatives led by Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu (front left) and Gen. Yoshijiro Umezu (front right) listen to surrender ceremonies on board the USS Missouri on Sept. 2, 1945. | ARMY SIGNAL CORPS COLLECTION IN THE U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES

National / History
Dependence day: Japan’s lopsided relationship with Washington
by Karel Van Wolferen


Special To The Japan Times


Aug 15, 2015
Article history
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/15/national/history/dependence-day-japans-lopsided-relationship-washington/#.VdEw3n3Hr6M


Of all the post-World War II changes in Japan, the most momentous is that it never regained the status of a genuinely independent country.


Tokyo cannot act freely by choosing what is likely to be most beneficial for itself or the region. Productive diplomacy between Japan and its neighbors is obstructed because of limitations imposed by a United States that treats Japan as if it were a protectorate rather than a sovereign country. Having followed the dynamics of the U.S.-Japan relationship for more than half a century, I can only conclude that Japan bends to American wishes because its representatives do not insist that it be treated as a sovereign state. Washington can get away with bullying Japan because it knows that national pride is not a problem with either media or political representatives. Some scrutiny of recent history makes that again very obvious.


When the prime minister of a recently elected government that ended half a century of de-facto, one-party democracy in Japan requested a meeting with a new American president to discuss how the two countries could jointly develop new approaches to regional problems, the White House and the State Department had no time for him. Democratic Party of Japan leader Yukio Hatoyama made his request no less than three times and the rebuff was handled in a scandalously undiplomatic manner. Washington made clear from the outset that it did not accept a reformist government that hoped to develop a new policy of friendship with China and new forms of regional cooperation. Ozawa Ichiro, then-secretary-general of the DPJ, had filled several jumbo jets with politicians, artists and other people of culture to visit Chinese cities as part of a campaign to improve party-to-party and people-to-people relations. Hatoyama wanted to strengthen regional cooperation with an ASEAN+3 group that included China, South Korea and Japan. Even before the elections that brought the DPJ to power, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made clear that, no matter which party would win, there would be no change in earlier plans concerning a new base for the marines stationed in Okinawa. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates even pointedly refused to attend a banquet in his honor when he visited Tokyo in the autumn of 2009. In the meantime, State Department officials were briefing journalists who were covering Japan out of Washington with conclusions that perhaps they had mistakenly thought of China rather than Japan as the biggest source of future headaches in the region.


But regime change in Tokyo is not all that difficult: all you need is the cooperation of a segment of the bureaucracy and the daily newspapers. Since these are essentially addicted to the status quo, they can be relied on to do Washington’s bidding. Hatoyama’s Cabinet went down over the Okinawa deal after the prime minister had been misled to believe that a compromise was being prepared. At that point, and after a number of Japanese bureaucrats as well as Liberal Democratic Party stalwarts had been telling their connections in Washington not to take the new reformist government seriously, Hatoyama was pilloried by Japan’s mainstream media and portrayed as a naive leader responsible for foreign policy failure. In the meantime, an embryonic new China policy vanished to create a vacuum in which political mischief could flourish, leading to a standoff over the Senkaku Islands.


When the LDP returned to power with its ally, New Komeito, after winning a clear majority in the Lower House — with roughly the same number of votes that had brought it down in 2009 — Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was handed the difficult task of strengthening a rather precarious mandate. When you reach the top of anything, you look around to identify clearly available opportunities to make a most auspicious entry. Abe could have gone to Moscow, where Vladimir Putin was waiting to make a deal — the best Japan could ever hope to get — on the Northern Territories. Concluding such a deal and carrying it with the draft of a long-delayed Russian-Japanese peace treaty in his pocket, he could then have flown to Beijing to reach agreement in respect to the Senkakus by returning to the Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping formula of dealing with the issue.


Back-channel communication held out much promise that the Chinese would have been amenable to that as well. Abe would then have been on the covers of news magazines the world over as the newly arisen statesman of Asia, and both China and Russia would have less reason to wonder with whom they are actually negotiating when talking to Japanese diplomats. Instead, Abe followed the custom of first applying for an audience at the White House. Eagerly so, because he wanted to be reassured that if it came to real blows with China there would be guaranteed American protection. Washington, likewise in character, told Abe to get in line and wait a few months because of President Barack Obama’s busy schedule.


The lopsided relationship of the two nations and Japan’s fundamental subservience, which Hatoyama had wanted to do something about, had for decades worked very well. It is unlikely that Japan would have had its proverbial economic miracle without it. Washington allowed Japan to wall off its financial system from the rest of the world, and allowed full-speed expansion of Japanese market shares in the U.S. to the considerable disadvantage of American domestic industry.


After making sure in the mid-1950s that formal government would be in the hands of one anti-left party, which it had helped bring into being and which could be counted on to stick to unspoken understandings, Washington did not get involved in domestic arrangements. At the outset of the post-World War II period, Prime Ministers Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi Nobusuke had decided that Japanese subservience along with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was to be provisional, something to keep in place only until the country had regained its strength. However, their successors at the top of Japan’s political apparatus never found reason to remind themselves of this. Subsequent generations of Japanese politicians had lost the ability even to imagine an independent foreign policy that would have elasticity to adjust to changing world conditions.


The advantages of subservience no longer apply today. American protection these days exists only in theory, and both the global economic and political situations have radically changed from what they were until a quarter century ago. The negligence of the Japanese policy elites as actors on the global stage is, along with that of their European counterparts, a fateful element in world affairs. Top politicians of what used to be called the “free world” have for two generations not been called upon to position themselves independently in basic foreign policy and defense matters. They have had no practice.


The world that witnessed the birth of the Cold War alliance no longer exists. Most importantly, Japan’s foreign affairs and defense bureaucrats, and politicians who make it to the U.S.-Japan interface are no longer dealing with the same country they dealt with and could manipulate to a considerable extent for decades. Some politically prominent Japanese I talk to understand that the United States has undergone a metamorphosis, and that its neocon- and liberal-hawk-scripted policies aimed at “full-spectrum dominance” do not add up to a feasible strategy. To think that the United States can ensure global political security today is ludicrous. But tenacious habits of thought, solidly embedded institutions and inexperience continue to characterize the non-American part of what was once called the “free world.”


Meanwhile, the fact that the United States has by proxy been looking after those things by which a state is internationally known has helped preserve the mostly capable administrative core of the Japanese state without effective means for political decision-making — the much-commented upon “absent steering wheel.”


Edwin Reischauer once told me that what I identified as a weakness in Japan should be seen as a good thing “because such a political center would not have been up to much good anyway.” This illustrated a post-World War II tradition of condescension among American officials dealing with Japan. Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage, two people who concern themselves most noticeably with U.S.-Japan relations, illustrated this again with a recent report in which they encourage Japan to become more mature by heeding American instructions.


Washington clearly sees Japan as an asset in its full-spectrum dominance gambits in the Western Pacific, the so-called Asian pivot — hence the need for constitutional revision. Nevertheless, it still nurses a lingering belief that it must also function in a role comparable to a parole officer on guard against downsliding to 1930s thinking. Japan must not step too far to the right, with more than a minimum of Yasukuni Shrine visits and denial of committed war crimes.


Abe wants to slalom between those two markers. The policies he stands for fall into two categories that do not sit together well. He appears most interested in re-creating a Japan that has only ever existed in right-wing imagination, one of harmonious living in which young people are polite and everyone properly shows love for their country. At the same time, however, he wants to make Washington happy with secrecy laws, constitutional revision and a tighter rein on the media.


When compared to the United States and the European Union, the Japanese situation gives perhaps more reasons to nourish positive expectations. There is no plutocracy in Japan that forces neoliberal arrangements down the throats of the population. There has been no great transfer of wealth from the middle reaches to the top of society. Japan’s economic bureaucrats and business federations are not in the first place in the business of self-enrichment; their incentives are still shaped by the idea of national industrial strength and prowess.


But Japan is likely to suffer from its failing to act in response to the great changes the world has undergone. Unlike what Japan’s foreign affairs and defense bureaucracy still appear to believe, the continued existence of North Korea is not an extension of Cold War conditions. North Korean aggression, were the rulers of Pyongyang so suicidal to indulge in it, would not be supported by either China or Russia. North Korean hostility has on its own become a separate political reality, demanding an entirely new diplomatic approach. The marines on Okinawa are not there to defend Japan. They function as an attack force to be used in the Middle East or Central Asia. Strictly speaking, they are there in violation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which stipulates that the leased bases must be used for defending Japan. Any disturbance triggered by developments in Pyongyang will have to be dealt with in the first place by South Korea and China. Hence a Japan serious about any potential threat from North Korea should work on deepening relevant diplomacy with them.


In the immediate future, Japan may miss the boat in connection with the vast Eurasian infrastructural developments, including high-speed rail connections across Siberia linking Chinese coastal cities directly with ports in Europe (which promises to become the heaviest traveled trade route in history). In the longer term, a Japan that allows itself to get entangled in America’s full-spectrum dominance scheme can only invite disaster upon itself.


Karel van Wolferen is a Dutch author who has published more than 20 books on public policy issues, including the best-selling “The Enigma of Japanese Power.”


Related story: Growing influence of Japan Conference reflects resentment at Tokyo’s postwar settlement with Washington
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